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103 
DUN & BRADSTREET REVISITED — A COMMENT ON 
LEVINE AND WERMIEL 
Scott L. Nelson* 
Lee Levine and Stephen Wermiel’s account of the internal history of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc.1 convincingly demonstrates the utility of the papers of 
retired Justices in facilitating a painstaking reconstruction of the Court’s 
deliberations. As someone who clerked for Justice Byron White in the 
October 1984 and 1985 Terms and was thus present during the second of 
the two years in which the Court considered Dun & Bradstreet,2 I will 
not comment on the accuracy of the particular details the Article reports 
or add any inside information about the Court’s deliberations. That 
would be both improper and impossible. Improper because a law clerk 
has a duty of confidentiality both toward his or her Justice and toward 
the Court as an institution; and impossible because, not having worked 
on the case myself, I have only fuzzy recollections concerning the many 
twists and turns the Article describes, and certainly none that match the 
wealth of detail the authors have gleaned from the documentary record. 
I will, however, try to situate the case within the broader context of 
the issues before the Court during the 1984 Term, which may give the 
reader a more accurate perspective from which to judge whether the 
story of Dun & Bradstreet is that of a doctrinal perfect storm or a 
                                                     
* Scott L. Nelson is a senior attorney with Public Citizen Litigation Group in Washington, D.C., 
where he has a broad public-interest practice including litigation before the Supreme Court of the 
United States. Before joining Public Citizen, he was a partner in the Washington, D.C., law firm 
Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin. He was a law clerk to the Honorable Byron R. White during the 
1984 and 1985 terms of the Supreme Court. The author would like to express his thanks to the 
editors of the Washington Law Review for their assistance in preparing this piece for publication.  
1. 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
2. Unlike Levine and Wermiel, and my fellow commenters, I refer to the case as Dun & 
Bradstreet, not Greenmoss Builders. That is what I recall the case being called at the time it was 
reargued; that is how the Court has referred to it on the very few occasions when a later opinion has 
cited it more than once, for example, Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215–16 
(2011); and that is how I have always thought of it. I am going against the flow on this point not 
because I think one way of referring to the case is more correct than the other, but for purely 
personal reasons. For me, it would feel unnatural to call the case anything but Dun & Bradstreet. 
Perhaps, like Justice White at times, I am simply “out of step.” See infra note 68 and accompanying 
text. 
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tempest in a teapot—or, perhaps more likely, something in between. I 
will also comment on the usefulness of the sources relied on by the 
authors in creating an accurate picture of the Court’s workings. Finally, I 
will offer some brief observations on the issues in Dun & Bradstreet, the 
problems it posed for the Court, and the decision’s place in the evolution 
of the Court’s First Amendment libel jurisprudence. 
I.  CONTEXT: THE SUPREME COURT’S 1984 TERM 
Levine and Wermiel understandably present Dun & Bradstreet as a 
story of considerable drama, with large issues, including the fate of New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 hanging in the balance. The case’s odd 
history, including its reargument and the apparent change in outcome 
that transformed Justice Powell’s opinion from a dissent to a plurality 
opinion announcing the Court’s judgment, as well as the fundamental 
issues raised by Justice White’s concurrence, lends itself to that 
portrayal. Such a case, readers of their Article might understandably 
conclude, must have been one of the focal points of the Term when it 
was reargued, much like last Term’s decision in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius,4 in which the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act and, according to leaks 
reported in the press, the Court’s deliberations led to considerable rancor 
among the Justices. 
But perhaps not. Sebelius was one of only sixty-four signed opinions 
issued by the Court in cases briefed and argued on the merits in the 
October 2011 Term, and it towered in practical, political, and doctrinal 
importance over most of the other cases on the Court’s docket. That is 
not to say that there were not other important and interesting cases in the 
2011 Term, but much of the Court’s small docket was taken up by small 
cases, half of which were decided unanimously or with only a single 
dissent.5 
By contrast, in the October 1984 Term, the Court disposed of a 
whopping 139 cases by signed opinions. And Dun & Bradstreet does not 
stand out now in retrospect, nor did it stand out at the time, as the 
                                                     
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
4. __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
5. See October Term 2011 – Granted and Noted List, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S. (June 29, 
2012), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/grantednotedlist.aspx?Filename=11grantednotedlist.html (case 
list of October Term 2011 opinions); 2011 Term Opinions of the Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE 
U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinions.aspx?Term=11 (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) 
(follow the links to case names to determine how the Justices voted in each opinion).  
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leading case of the Term or even close to it. Although the 1984 Term 
was not dominated by any one landmark case like Sebelius, the Term 
featured a wealth of important decisions in a wide range of areas, and 
many of them divided the Court at least as deeply as Dun & Bradstreet 
did. 
A few examples, somewhat arbitrarily chosen, will illustrate the 
breadth of the business conducted by the Court in the 1984 Term. 
Criminal procedure and death penalty cases were a major focus of the 
Burger Court, and the Term featured a number of prominent examples: 
Oregon v. Elstad,6 concerning the fruits of Miranda violations; 
Wainwright v. Witt,7 rejecting a Sixth Amendment challenge to the use 
of “death qualified” jurors to determine guilt in capital cases; and Ake v. 
Oklahoma,8 establishing that indigent capital defendants have a right to 
state-paid psychiatric experts when necessary to their defense. 
Establishment Clause cases were also a major feature of the 1984 Term, 
with decisions including Wallace v. Jaffree,9 the “moment of silence” 
case; Aguilar v. Felton10 and School District of City of Grand Rapids v. 
Ball,11 both striking down aid to parochial schools (and both later 
overruled by the Rehnquist Court12); and Thornton v. Caldor,13 holding 
unconstitutional a state statute that gave preferential rights to Sabbath 
observing employees. Other major cases in the 1984 Term included 
Mitchell v. Forsyth,14 allowing interlocutory appeals of decisions 
denying qualified immunity to public officials sued for constitutional 
violations; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,15 a 
milestone in the Court’s developing jurisprudence, favoring the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements; Tennessee v. Garner,16 holding 
that the Fourth Amendment limits the use of deadly force by law 
enforcement officers; Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,17 
rejecting Justice Rehnquist’s effort to create a “bitter with the sweet” 
                                                     
6. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
7. 469 U.S. 412 (1985). 
8. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
9. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
10. 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
11. 473 U.S. 373 (1985). 
12. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).  
13. 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
14. 472 U.S. 511 (1985). 
15. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
16. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
17. 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
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doctrine limiting procedural due process rights; Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz,18 concerning due process limitations on the assertion of 
personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants; Heckler v. Chaney,19 
sharply curtailing judicial review of agency enforcement discretion; City 
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,20 applying rational basis review 
with teeth under the Equal Protection Clause to strike down 
discrimination against the disabled; and County of Oneida v. Oneida 
Indian Nation,21 allowing Indian land claims litigation to proceed. 
Even in the area of freedom of speech, Dun & Bradstreet did not 
particularly stand out as among the most important cases of the Term. 
Competing for that title would be Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel,22 a major commercial speech case striking down limits on 
attorney advertising; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises,23 rejecting a claim of fair use and First Amendment 
protection for the appropriation of copyrighted material of public 
interest; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.,24 
limiting First Amendment rights to expression in a “nonpublic forum” 
created by the government; Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.,25 further 
refining the Court’s definition of obscenity and distinguishing the 
appropriate uses of facial and as-applied challenges; FEC v. National 
Conservative Political Action Committee,26 striking down limits on 
expenditures by political action committees; In re Snyder,27 holding that 
an attorney may not be disciplined for writing a letter criticizing a 
court’s handling of a request for attorney’s fees; and Lowe v. SEC,28 
limiting the application of securities laws to newsletters and other 
publications. 
Indeed, among the three cases in which the Court announced on July 
5, 1984, that it would hear reargument in the October 1984 Term—Dun 
& Bradstreet, New Jersey v. T.L.O.,29 and Garcia v. San Antonio 
                                                     
18. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
19. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
20. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
21. 470 U.S. 226 (1985). 
22. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
23. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
24. 473 U.S. 788 (1985). 
25. 472 U.S. 491 (1985). 
26. 470 U.S. 480 (1985). 
27. 472 U.S. 634 (1985). 
28. 472 U.S. 181 (1985). 
29. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
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Metropolitan Transit Authority30—Dun & Bradstreet was the one with 
the lowest profile. The narrow questions on which the Court solicited 
reargument in Dun & Bradstreet stood in marked contrast to the 
questions implicated in the other two cases: what standards apply to 
searches and seizures in the public schools (T.L.O.), and whether the 
Court’s abortive foray into revitalizing the Tenth Amendment in 
National League of Cities v. Usery31 should be overruled (Garcia). Of 
course, had the Court requested reargument in Dun & Bradstreet about 
whether Times v. Sullivan should be overruled, the relative importance 
of the cases would have appeared rather different. But that was not the 
question actually posed by the Court, nor does it appear from the now 
publicly available record of the Court’s deliberations that any of the 
Justices other than Justice White (and, in response, Justice Brennan) 
viewed the case as really presenting that question. 
None of this, of course, is intended to contradict Levine and 
Wermiel’s careful tracing of the documentary history of the case. Nor is 
it meant to suggest that the case was not viewed as very important by 
Justice Brennan and his law clerks, as the written history compiled by 
the Brennan Chambers clearly indicates; by Justice Powell, who appears 
from the documents cited in the Article to have been deeply engaged in 
the case and in the not entirely successful struggle to articulate a 
coherent rationale for affirmance; and by Justice White, who seems from 
the record to have vacillated about the outcome before deciding to use 
the case to toss a grenade (or, perhaps more accurately, a cherry bomb, 
given its inefficacy) at Times v. Sullivan. 
Nonetheless, the Article may subtly overstate the degree to which the 
case was a dramatic focal point of the Term. The sheer number of other 
important (and also not-so-important) cases competing for the attention 
of the Court suggests that it was not. And even the records cited by the 
authors do not seem to indicate that the rest of the Court felt the same 
degree of interest in the case as the three protagonists. What had become 
by that time something of a liberal bloc—Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, 
and Stevens—lined up dutifully behind their leader (notwithstanding the 
qualms Marshall had earlier expressed about extending Times v. 
Sullivan,32 and the similar reservations that would lead Stevens to dissent 
the next Term in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps33), and their 
                                                     
30. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
31. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
32. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 78 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
33. 475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
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involvement seems to have been largely confined to Justice Stevens’s 
wise counsel that Brennan should not get too carried away by the idea 
that the case was some kind of referendum on Times v. Sullivan.34 
Meanwhile, the conservatives—Burger, Rehnquist, and O’Connor—
backed the outcome favored by Powell, though the documentary record 
indicates that Burger (typically) cared little how the Court got there; that 
Rehnquist seems to have been bemused by the thought that Powell, as 
the author of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,35 would suddenly have qualms 
about constitutionalizing libel law; and that O’Connor played a role 
similar to that of Stevens on the other side, counseling a way to get the 
case over with a minimum of additional fuss.36 Thus, another reading of 
the record cited by Levine and Wermiel is that for the Court as a whole, 
the case was not a matter of huge significance, but rather one that was 
more trouble than it was worth, and probably of less interest than much 
of the rest of the Court’s business that Term. 
II.  THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD PROVIDED BY THE 
FORMER JUSTICES’ PUBLICLY AVAILABLE PAPERS 
The point I have just made is one about matters of importance and 
emphasis, not accuracy. For me, one of the principal contributions of 
Levine and Wermiel’s Article is that it illustrates the degree to which the 
publicly available papers of the Burger Court’s Justices allow—for 
better or for worse, depending on one’s views of the importance of 
confidentiality versus openness of such deliberative processes—an 
almost complete account of the Court’s internal deliberations over cases 
it decided, from the certiorari stage through decision on the merits. 
At the certiorari stage, the primary documents that allow insight into 
the considerations that may have shaped the Court’s decision to grant 
review of a case are the law clerks’ “pool memos.” Pool memos are 
memoranda discussing each petition for certiorari filed with the Court, 
which were prepared in each case by one of the law clerks for the six 
Justices (Burger, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor) 
who participated in the “cert pool” at that time. Copies of those memos 
were circulated to each of the Justices in the pool, and complete sets 
appear to be available in the publicly available papers of several of the 
                                                     
34. Lee Levine & Stephen Wermiel, The Landmark that Wasn’t: A First Amendment Play in Five 
Acts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1, 87–89 (2013). 
35. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
36. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 47, 86–89 (Burger), 39, 73–74 (Rehnquist), 60–63, 71 
(O’Connor). 
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Justices. The copies of the pool memos retained by each of the 
participating chambers will differ slightly because of annotations by the 
Justices’ law clerks and the Justices themselves. These annotations 
provide additional insights about the views of a case in particular 
chambers. Accounts of actual discussion of certiorari petitions by the 
Justices in Conference are likely to be sketchy at best, but in cases (such 
as Dun & Bradstreet) where there were not four votes to grant certiorari 
the first time a petition was discussed, additional insights into the 
Court’s decision-making process may be gleaned from drafts of dissents 
from denial of certiorari, which were circulated to all the Justices and 
often served as advocacy pieces seeking to sway enough votes to result 
in a grant of certiorari. 
In cases set for argument before the Court, some preliminary insights 
into the Justices’ deliberations may be derived from bench memoranda 
prepared by the Justices’ law clerks, and in some cases preargument 
memoranda prepared by the Justices themselves. But not all Justices 
received bench memoranda in all cases, and such memoranda, even 
where they exist, are unreliable as indicia of the positions of the Justices, 
as the law clerks’ views of a case might differ completely from those of 
their Justices. Nonetheless, those memoranda, together with the 
recordings and transcripts of arguments before the Court (which 
unfortunately during that era did not identify the Justices who posed 
particular questions to the advocates), may provide some clues about the 
evolution of the Justices’ thinking leading up to the Conferences at 
which they discussed and voted on the cases. 
The Court’s practice in the 1984 Term was to hear four one-hour 
arguments a day, Monday through Wednesday, during the two weeks of 
each sitting. The Court voted on cases argued on Mondays at a 
Conference held after the completion of arguments on Wednesday 
afternoon, and voted on the Tuesday and Wednesday cases at the Friday 
Conference where petitions for certiorari were also considered. The 
Conferences, attended only by the Justices, are something of a black 
box, as there were no witnesses and no official record was kept of the 
Justices’ deliberations. Each Justice kept his or her own notes, more or 
less elaborate; Justice White’s generally consisted simply of vote tallies 
for each case scribbled in pencil on small pieces of paper. Apparently, 
Justices Powell and Brennan kept more elaborate notes, and other 
Justices may have done so as well; and Justice Brennan appears to have 
given his clerks accounts of what was said that appear in their histories 
of the Term (about which more later). Notwithstanding the availability 
of these sources, reconstruction of Conferences is probably one of the 
least reliable elements of any attempt to write a history of the Court’s 
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consideration of a case. Fortunately, it is also probably not the most 
important aspect of such a history, as the Justices tended to flesh out 
their views in the opinion-writing process that followed, rather than in 
the necessarily abbreviated discussions in the Conferences, at which the 
Court had to address multiple cases in fairly limited amounts of time. 
Following the Conference at which the Justices cast their initial votes 
on a case, much of the critical action revealed itself in documents that 
went to all the Justices. Such memoranda were typically addressed to 
“the Conference,” which in the parlance of the Court at the time meant 
the nine Justices collectively. The outcome of the Court’s vote can 
generally be inferred by the memorandum from the senior Justice in the 
majority assigning the majority opinion, which usually circulated a day 
or two after the final Conference of each sitting. Initial opinion drafts 
exchanged between the Justices and their law clerks were of course 
generally not circulated beyond chambers, and may or may not now be 
available in the papers of the writing Justice, depending on the document 
retention practices of the particular Justice and, perhaps, on the 
happenstance of whether a law clerk discarded a marked-up draft after 
entering changes into the document on the word processing system used 
by the Court at the time. Finished drafts, however, were sent to the 
Court’s printer to be typeset and then circulated in page-proof form to 
the Conference. Memoranda joining or commenting on draft opinions 
were also circulated to the Conference, as were memoranda expressing 
the intention to draft a dissenting or concurring opinion (or to await an 
anticipated draft of a separate opinion from another Justice). Separate 
opinions, once drafted, were also printed and circulated to the 
Conference, as were the resulting revisions and counter-revisions that 
followed. The general circulation of these items ensures that a fairly 
complete record can be pieced together from the papers now publicly 
available. 
As the records of the Dun & Bradstreet case reviewed by Levine and 
Wermiel demonstrate, a Justice sometimes sent a memorandum 
commenting on the issues posed by an opinion only to one or two other 
Justices (or added a handwritten addendum to one Justice’s copy of a 
memorandum otherwise circulated to the Conference as a whole). The 
Article cites examples where such privately exchanged memoranda 
contained substantive comments on opinions that were perhaps more 
detailed or candid than appropriate for circulation to the Conference. I 
believe that, at least in the 1984–86 timeframe, such memoranda were 
much rarer than those that went to the Conference, and often their 
content would be reflected in some form in follow-up memoranda to the 
Conference and/or in revisions to circulated opinions. Nonetheless, as 
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the Dun & Bradstreet case illustrates, access to such private memoranda, 
such as the O’Connor–Powell and Stevens–Brennan memos cited by 
Levine and Wermiel,37 may be critical to understanding the evolution of 
the Justices’ thinking and the resulting opinions. Fortunately, the papers 
of enough of the Justices from that era are now publicly available that 
the likelihood that either the author’s or the recipient’s copy will be in 
one of the available sets of papers is fairly high. 
What the paper record does not necessarily reflect, of course, is the 
role that telephone conversations or face-to-face meetings between the 
Justices may have played in shaping the outcomes of cases and the 
evolution of opinions. Except in a few famous (reputed) instances that 
have come to light as a result of ostensible leaks of some kind—such as 
the account in The Brethren of a lunch meeting between Justices 
Brennan, Stewart, and White at a now-defunct Washington, D.C., 
restaurant called the Market Inn, at which the Justices supposedly 
“conspired” to take over the opinion in United States v. Nixon,38 which 
Chief Justice Burger had assigned to himself39—such person-to-person 
interactions of the Justices will for the most part necessarily be lost to 
history. (As an aside, I note that Justice White enjoyed taking his law 
clerks, and sometimes their parents, to lunch or dinner at the Market Inn 
and on more than one occasion of which I am aware, loudly stated in the 
presence of outsiders that “that table” or “that booth” was the one where 
he, Potter Stewart, and “Billy” Brennan had conspired to take the 
opinion in Nixon from the Chief Justice, sometimes adding, “if you can 
believe what it says in The Brethren.”)40 
However, my own observation of the Court and that, I believe, of 
most of my contemporaries, was that substantive conversations among 
the Justices outside of formal Conferences were surprisingly rare and far 
less common than written communications. And, as the papers 
canvassed by Levine and Wermiel demonstrate, even when these 
conversations occurred they were often confirmed by or referenced in 
subsequent memoranda. For the most part, then, the primary documents 
now available in the public papers of the Justices—that is, the 
contemporaneous drafts and memoranda, both internal to their chambers 
and circulated to the Conference or to specific colleagues—provide the 
                                                     
37. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 83–84 (Stevens), 60–62, 71–72 (O’Connor). 
38. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
39. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 322–
28 (1979). 
40. See also Stephen McAllister, Justice Byron White and The Brethren, 15 GREEN BAG 2D 159, 
168–69 (2012). 
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basis for a reasonably accurate account of the Court’s decision-making 
process in any given case. 
That is not to say that context may not be helpful in examining the 
documentary record. For example, the January 1985 memorandum from 
Justice White to Justice Brennan quoted by Levine and Wermiel, in 
which Justice White refers to “fleeing the city for a week or two” after 
circulating his draft calling for the reconsideration of Times v. Sullivan,41 
may appear in a somewhat different light if one knows (as Justice 
Brennan certainly did) that Justice White generally spent at least a week 
skiing in his native Colorado during the long hiatus between the Court’s 
early January and late February sittings. (I recall that particular vacation 
well, as I used the occasion of Justice White’s absence from chambers to 
grow a beard, which I have kept to this day.) Justice Brennan would 
have understood Justice White’s comment to be a facetious reference to 
his skiing plans, but one that also reflected White’s obvious awareness 
that his longtime colleague and friend would be none too pleased by the 
draft that shortly followed. Justice White’s personal note to Brennan 
warning him of the imminent circulation of the draft is consistent with 
his great esteem for Justice Brennan, of whom he invariably spoke in the 
most affectionate terms, frequently referring to him as “Billy”—which 
Justice Brennan himself once described as “an unusual but quite 
agreeable moniker.”42 
So far, I have discussed the primary documents on which Wermiel 
and Levine rely, but I should also add a word or two about another 
source—something between a primary and a secondary source—that 
they also use very effectively: the “histories” compiled by the Brennan 
clerks. The Brennan histories were, of course, compiled very close in 
time to the events they recount, by participants in those events, and they 
appear to rely to a large extent on the primary historical record—the 
memoranda and drafts that directly record the Justices’ interactions 
leading to the issuance of the Court’s opinions. At the same time, 
however, the histories are after-the-fact reconstructions, and they rely 
not only on the documents, but also on the recollections of the clerks as 
well as on second- and third-hand accounts, including, it appears, 
information provided by Justice Brennan about what went on in 
Conferences and about his interactions with other Justices, as well as 
hearsay accounts from other law clerks, containing information that may 
                                                     
41. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 63. 
42. William J. Brennan, “Cheers!” A Tribute to Byron R. White, 1994 BYU L. REV. 209, 225 
(1994). 
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have been garbled in transmission. As a result, the histories provide 
information about some of the oral communications among Justices and 
law clerks that are otherwise undocumented and beyond the ken of 
history. At the same time, however, that information may not be entirely 
accurate. 
The histories are also, as Levine and Wermiel’s excerpts indicate, 
written from a point of view: that of Brennan and his clerks (actually not 
a single point of view, but multiple points of view, though ones that 
from the perspective of someone outside the Brennan Chambers usually 
though not invariably appeared to be closely aligned). The histories thus 
reflected the standpoint of persons who had been directly involved in 
and cared deeply about the disagreements within the Court that the 
histories discuss. And what the histories say is likely, at times, colored 
by their authors’ perspectives, and perhaps by the expectation that the 
histories would ultimately be made public (an expectation very different 
from that which prevailed in the White Chambers, where preserving a 
record for posterity was definitely not among the law clerks’ tasks). 
To use one example from Levine and Wermiel’s Article, the Brennan 
histories apparently state that during Dun & Bradstreet’s first Term 
before the Court, and following Justice White’s circulation of a 
memorandum stating that he would await Justice Powell’s anticipated 
dissent before deciding whether to join Justice Brennan’s draft opinion 
reversing the Vermont Supreme Court, “Brennan’s [C]hambers learned 
that White’s own clerks ‘as usual, had no idea what was bothering’ their 
Justice.”43 
I must say at the outset that I myself have “no idea” whether Justice 
White’s law clerks knew what was “bothering” him about Dun & 
Bradstreet in early June 1984, or, indeed, whether his law clerks in the 
1983 Term generally had any idea what was on his mind with respect to 
particular cases. However, given the source, I would recommend that 
readers take statements like this one from the Brennan histories with a 
grain of salt. 
Justice White could certainly be a hard person to read, even for his 
law clerks, and his views were at times, though certainly not invariably, 
less predictable than those of some of the other Justices seemed to be. In 
addition, Justice White, like most other Justices at the time, did not 
choose law clerks based on ideological agreement with him (indeed, it 
would have been virtually impossible for him to choose law clerks on 
that basis, given that hardly anyone coming out of law school at that 
                                                     
43. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 28. 
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time shared Justice White’s particular combination of views), so his law 
clerks were not necessarily on the same wavelength as their boss in any 
individual case. At the same time, the Justice’s views had a logic to them 
if you could figure out his conceptual starting point. And by the time a 
case had been briefed and argued, discussed in chambers by the Justice 
and all four of his law clerks following argument (as was his practice at 
the time), and voted on by the Conference (following which the Justice 
would report the vote of the Justices, including his own, to his law 
clerks), I generally felt that I had a fairly good idea of the Justice’s views 
about the case even though he tended to be fairly closed-mouthed in 
explaining them. I expect the same was true of the Justice’s clerks 
during the October 1983 Term, all of whom were then, and are now, 
extremely able and intelligent. 
Having an idea of what was on Justice White’s mind, however, was 
not necessarily the same thing as sharing that understanding with law 
clerks from other chambers. Unlike Justice Brennan’s law clerks, who 
sometimes appeared to act as emissaries for their Justice in 
communications with other chambers, Justice White’s law clerks were 
generally not expected to negotiate with other chambers over opinions or 
to serve as informal messengers expressing his views to his colleagues 
on the bench through their own law clerks. When Justice White was 
ready to communicate his views to his colleagues, he did so directly, and 
usually in writing, not through his law clerks. Justice Brennan’s law 
clerks, however, may not have completely understood that Justice 
White’s law clerks felt considerably more constrained about purporting 
to express their Justice’s views than did the Brennan clerks, and as a 
result may have confused a White clerk’s reticence about saying what 
was “bothering” Justice White with a lack of understanding. 
Thus, I would recommend that readers disregard the “as usual” in the 
passage cited by Wermiel and Levine, ascribing it either to 
misunderstanding or perhaps mild snarkiness. But as for whether Justice 
White’s law clerks in fact knew what was bothering him in this instance 
(and again I stress that I have no inside information on the point) it 
seems plausible that they did not—not because of some general lack of 
insight into Justice White’s mind, but because the record compiled by 
Levine and Wermiel strongly suggests that the Justice himself had not 
yet come to rest in his thinking about the case. 
Why do I say this? All the communications from Justice White that 
Levine and Wermiel cite from the relevant time period (late May to early 
July 1984), including the oral communications ascribed to Justice White 
in the Brennan histories, seem consistent with those of a Justice who was 
genuinely, as he stated in his June 25, 1984, memorandum, “up in the 
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air.”44 The memoranda and conversations described by the authors 
suggest that although Justice White was inclined to want to join Justice 
Powell in affirming, he did not see a satisfactory way of doing so 
consistent with the Court’s precedents, which, as his tentative draft 
concurring statement indicated, were more consistent with reversal than 
affirmance.45 Even Justice White’s suggestion of reargument seems 
strangely formless, as it does not appear to have indicated exactly what 
issue he wanted to have reargued. That matter, according to the 
documentary record, was left to Justices Brennan and Powell to 
negotiate,46 and the questions that they came up with certainly did not 
encompass the issue Justice White ultimately focused on the next 
Term—whether Gertz and even Times v. Sullivan were correctly 
decided. Had Justice White already decided that that was the nub of the 
case, the suggestion that the case be reargued on other issues would have 
made little sense. 
The bottom line here is that the Brennan histories, in this particular 
instance, may or may not be accurate in detail (as to whether Justice 
White’s law clerks in fact had any idea what was bothering him about 
the case in June 1984), but they appear to reflect accurately that Justice 
White’s unsettled position was a source of confusion and consternation 
in Justice Brennan’s Chambers. The broader lesson is that the histories 
are most useful as a reflection of Justice Brennan’s and his law clerks’ 
perspectives; beyond that, they help fill out the primary documentary 
record but should not be taken as gospel to the extent that they purport to 
recount the words or doings of other Justices. And as Levine and 
Wermiel’s Article shows, checking the histories against the documentary 
record, especially the part that is preserved in the collections of other 
contemporary Justices, may reveal instances in which the law clerks who 
wrote the histories had imperfect or incomplete knowledge.47 
III.  DUN & BRADSTREET’S PLACE IN THE COURT’S 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Finally, I offer a few words about the merits and significance of Dun 
& Bradstreet itself. Justice White’s advocacy of a grant of certiorari and 
the Court’s eventual acquiescence following his circulation of a draft 
dissent from denial do not appear terribly surprising. The Vermont 
                                                     
44. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 36–37. 
45. Id. at 37. 
46. Id. at 39–40. 
47. Id. at 71, n.423. 
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Supreme Court’s decision to withhold Gertz’s First Amendment-based 
protections from a non-media defendant sued for libel seemed 
inconsistent with the Court’s general unwillingness to grant different 
First Amendment protections to the media, even if it was not necessarily 
foreclosed by the Court’s existing libel precedents. As Justice White’s 
draft dissent from denial suggested, whether such an exception for non-
media defendants should be crafted was an issue “appropriate for 
consideration by th[e] Court because of [its] implications for First 
Amendment jurisprudence as a whole.”48 
Once the Court took the case, however, its problematic nature became 
apparent. The nature of the “speech” involved—the sale of commercial 
credit information about businesses—evidently appeared to many of the 
Justices to differentiate it from the speech that Times v. Sullivan, and 
even Gertz, were designed to protect. Dun & Bradstreet’s credit 
reporting hardly seemed as central to the interests of the First 
Amendment as reporting about controversial actions by public figures. 
(It is an interesting mark of how times have changed that conservative 
Justices in 1984–85 questioned whether such sales of information 
merited much First Amendment protection, while their conservative 
heirs on today’s Court seem to take precisely the opposite view.)49 
Credit reporting also is a particularly robust form of speech because of 
its profitability; it involves information that is readily confirmed as true 
or false with the exercise of due care; and false reports have great 
potential to cause harm. And the application of Gertz to such speech 
raised concerns among at least some of the Justices about whether the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, which provides for both presumed and 
punitive damages for “willful” false credit reports,50 would satisfy 
Gertz’s requirement that presumed or punitive damages may be imposed 
only on proof of “actual malice” in the Times v. Sullivan sense.51 
But the Court had written itself into a corner. Each of the potential 
ways of distinguishing Dun & Bradstreet from Gertz ran smack-dab into 
precedent. The Vermont Supreme Court’s media/non-media distinction 
seemed directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s repeated insistence that 
the media has no greater First Amendment protection than non-media 
                                                     
48. Id. at 13 (citation omitted). 
49. I refer to Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011), where the Court held 
that a prohibition on the sale of prescription data to marketers and data miners violated the First 
Amendment. 
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (1976).  
51. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 10, 20, 21. 
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speakers.52 The possibility that the sale of credit information might be 
defined as “commercial speech” entitled to a lesser degree of First 
Amendment protection did not fully jibe with existing definitions of 
commercial speech—speech proposing a commercial transaction, or, 
essentially, advertising—and expanding the category could pose difficult 
line-drawing problems.53 And the remaining possibility, limiting First 
Amendment protection because the speech in question did not concern a 
matter of public interest, ran afoul of Gertz, where Justice Powell had 
pooh-poohed the notion that the degree of First Amendment protection 
afforded to speech could depend on a public interest test.54 
All this was of little concern to a Justice, like Brennan, who was 
principally interested in defending Times v. Sullivan against any further 
inroads (and for whom Gertz itself was bad enough).55 But for a Justice 
inclined to think that the kind of speech at issue in Dun & Bradstreet 
should not receive protection even under the Gertz standard, the path 
forward was more difficult. There were two basic ways of affirming the 
outcome reached by the Vermont Supreme Court: overruling one or 
more precedents (most likely Gertz), or tacking on a conceptually 
incoherent exception to Gertz—conceptually incoherent because it 
would involve acceptance of some proposition that had been rejected 
either in Gertz or some other precedent of the Court. 
Conceptual incoherence was a preferred modus operandi of the 
Burger Court—limiting precedents (especially Warren Court ones) 
without overruling them56—and Dun & Bradstreet was no exception. 
For Powell, of course, overruling Gertz, his own handiwork, was out of 
the question, so he was condemned, even as he fought a more serious, 
and courageous, battle with cancer, to a months-long task of squaring the 
circle: maintaining Gertz, which was premised on the idea that whether 
speech concerned a matter of public interest was not a proper 
consideration in determining the First Amendment protection to which it 
was entitled, while cobbling on an exception to Gertz’s limits on 
presumed and punitive damages for, you guessed it, speech not 
concerning a matter of public interest. 
                                                     
52. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 
U.S. 817 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
53. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985). 
54. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). 
55. See id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
56. Charles Fried, attacking the Burger Court from the right, commented that this practice “piled 
incoherence on incoherence.” Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 76 
(1995). 
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Powell’s course involved a considerable degree of self-deception. 
Having thoroughly constitutionalized the law of libel in Gertz, he now 
presented himself as the champion of defending the common law against 
constitutionally based incursions—an irony that, according to the 
Brennan histories cited by Levine and Wermiel, had elicited a tart 
comment from Justice Rehnquist in one of the final Conferences where 
the Justices discussed the case in the 1983 Term.57 And even while 
purporting to defend the common law, Justice Powell apparently 
considered using the case to advance his pet project of defending 
corporate America by limiting punitive damages generally, not just in 
libel actions but in common-law tort actions generally.58 Powell’s dream 
was ahead of its time, as the limits on punitive damages he already 
contemplated in 1985 did not come to fruition for another decade, when 
a coalition of moderate and conservative Justices discovered due process 
limits on punitive damages, over the objection of the Court’s more 
principled conservatives and one liberal.59 
The documentary record compiled by Levine and Wermiel suggests 
that for Justice White, the incoherence of the effort to reconcile 
affirmance with the Court’s precedents was a sticking point, accounting 
for his apparent initial vote to reverse and his proposed terse 
concurrence in the judgment if the case were not reargued, which would 
have said simply that reversal was more consistent with the Court’s 
existing precedents than affirmance.60 At the same time, his lingering 
disagreement with Gertz and what were by his own account growing 
doubts about the wisdom of Times v. Sullivan itself appear to have 
inclined Justice White to want to look for a defensible approach that 
could lead to affirmance of the Vermont Supreme Court’s judgment—an 
approach he seems to have found lacking in Powell’s drafts both in the 
1983 Term and the 1984 Term. And perhaps Justice Brennan, by seizing 
the opportunity to write a broad paean to Times v. Sullivan and the First 
Amendment rather than a more spare this-is-what-our-precedents-require 
opinion (which would arguably have been more suitable for a case 
presenting such a narrow issue and involving such uninspiring facts),61 
drew out the contrarian in Justice White and led him to press for a 
                                                     
57. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 39. 
58. Id. at 42–44, 55, 59–60. After his retirement, Justice Powell publicly expressed his views on 
punitive damages. Lewis Powell, The Bizarre Results of Punitive Damages, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 
1995, at A21. 
59. See BMW of N. Am., Inc., v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
60. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 37. 
61. Id. at 26. 
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reargument that, he apparently hoped, would result in a better airing of 
the question whether there was a more principled basis for limiting 
Gertz. 
Reargument appears to have left White back where he started, 
however, with no better rationale for limiting Gertz apparent. That 
would seemingly account for his reported vote following reargument in 
the 1984 Term (according to the Brennan histories) to reverse unless the 
Court was prepared to overrule Gertz, which no other Justice was 
evidently willing to do.62 With support that grudging from his fifth vote, 
Justice Brennan, the great master at “counting to five,” might have been 
wise to scale back the opinion he had circulated the previous spring, but 
as the documentary record shows, he did not.63 It seems possible (and 
again I am only speculating here) that the unpalatability of joining an 
encomium to opinions he disliked was one of the factors that pushed 
Justice White over the edge and led him to circulate his opinion 
advocating that Gertz be overruled and describing Times v. Sullivan 
itself as “improvident.”64 
It is contrary to the Supreme Court’s normal practice to overrule 
decisions when no party has asked the Court to do so and the Court itself 
has not invited briefing or argument on the issue.65 Outside those 
circumstances, Justices usually, but not invariably, put aside their 
objections to decisions they disagreed with when issued and accept them 
as binding precedents, even if they may seek to narrow and distinguish 
them. Justice White normally played by those rules, but as a number of 
his opinions and votes from around the time of Dun & Bradstreet 
indicate, he was quite willing to join in, or to advocate, overruling 
decisions with which he strongly disagreed, whether that disagreement 
was longstanding or recently developed. 
In the 1984 Term itself, White joined the majority in Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority in overruling National League 
of Cities v. Usery,66 a decision from which he had dissented when it was 
issued.67 In the “moment of silence” case, Wallace v. Jaffree, he 
described himself as “out of step” with the Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence and called for a “basic reconsideration of [the Court’s] 
                                                     
62. Id. at 48–49. 
63. Id. at 52. 
64. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 774, 767 (1985) (White, J., 
dissenting).  
65. See, e.g., Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635 (2009). 
66. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
67. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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precedents” in the area,68 a view he repeated in his dissenting statement 
in Grand Rapids v. Ball and Aguilar v. Felton.69 The next term, he issued 
a strident call for overruling Roe v. Wade70 in his dissent in Thornburgh 
v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists.71 And in Batson 
v. Kentucky,72 he joined the Court in overruling his own opinion in 
Swain v. Alabama,73 which had prevented criminal defendants from 
challenging prosecutors’ racially discriminatory exercise of peremptory 
challenges in individual cases. In a concurring statement, he 
acknowledged that Swain had led to a situation in which “the practice of 
peremptorily eliminating blacks from petit juries in cases with black 
defendants remains widespread,” and agreed that “the time has come” to 
overrule it.74 
In short, Justice White was not shy about saying he thought an 
opinion should be overruled, even when he had joined it at the time it 
was first issued, as he had joined Times v. Sullivan. Thus, it is not 
terribly surprising that he eventually decided that even though the Court 
was not prepared to overrule Gertz, he would ultimately base his vote on 
the view that the case should be overruled, contrary to the position he 
had apparently expressed in Conference. And because the disagreement 
he had with Gertz was, fundamentally, a disagreement with the approach 
of Times v. Sullivan itself, it is equally unsurprising that he would aim 
much of his opinion at that decision. 
Even so, it is worth noting that while criticizing Times v. Sullivan, 
saying that it struck an “improvident balance,”75 and suggesting 
alternative ways of limiting libel law to protect First Amendment values 
that he thought preferable to the Times standard, he stopped short of 
explicitly calling for the Court to overrule Times v. Sullivan—unlike 
Gertz, which he stated “should be overruled.”76 That even an opinion 
that otherwise took direct aim at Times v. Sullivan shied away from 
calling for its overruling may indicate how firmly the decision had 
                                                     
68. 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (White, J., dissenting). 
69. 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (dissenting from both Grand Rapids v. Ball 
and Aguilar v. Felton). 
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
71. 476 U.S. 747, 785–86 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). 
72. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
73. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
74. Batson, 476 U.S. at 100–02 (White, J., concurring). 
75. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 767 (1985) (White, J., 
concurring). 
76. Id. at 774. 
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become entrenched by 1985. 
Indeed, the most striking thing about Justice White’s quixotic assault 
on Gertz and Times v. Sullivan was how little traction it gained 
elsewhere on the Court. Apart from Chief Justice Burger’s effort to join 
both Justice Powell in endorsing Gertz and Justice White in trashing it,77 
no other Justice expressed any interest in fundamentally rethinking the 
Court’s approach to libel and the First Amendment—not even Justice 
Rehnquist, the Justice on the Court at the time who was ostensibly the 
most averse to limiting state law through adventurous constitutional 
holdings. Justice White’s protest only highlighted the broad consensus 
on the Court in favor of Times v. Sullivan and even, remarkably, what 
Rehnquist is said to have referred to as the “last minute compromise” of 
Gertz.78 In light of that consensus, Justice Stevens was undoubtedly wise 
to counsel Justice Brennan not to react defensively, especially not with a 
defense that seemed “less persuasive” than Times v. Sullivan itself.79 
And Justice Brennan was wise to take that advice, notwithstanding his 
initial inclination to mount a full defense of Times v. Sullivan proceeding 
from “Meiklejohnian premises”80 (a phrase that sounds much more like 
it came from a Brennan clerk than from Brennan himself). 
The extent to which Times v. Sullivan and its progeny had already 
won, despite Justice White’s lone protest, was illustrated the very next 
term, when a majority of the Court (including Dun & Bradstreet’s 
supposedly staunch defenders of state law, Justices Powell and 
O’Connor) added yet another limitation on the operation of common-law 
libel in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, holding that the First 
Amendment requires libel plaintiffs in cases involving speech on 
subjects of public concern to bear the burden of proving falsity as well 
as the requisite degree of fault.81 (Interestingly, it was Justice Stevens, 
joined by White, Burger, and Rehnquist, who spearheaded the dissent to 
that holding.)82 
And that same term, Justice White gave libel defendants one of their 
greatest victories in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,83 which held that a 
court considering a summary judgment motion in a libel case must 
consider whether there is an issue of fact for the jury in light of the 
                                                     
77. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 86–87. 
78. Id. at 19 (citation omitted). 
79. Id. at 83 (citation omitted). 
80. Id. at 66 (citation omitted). 
81. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986). 
82. Id. at 780 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
83. 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
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standard of proof required under Times v. Sullivan: clear and convincing 
evidence. The decision, which confers a tremendous procedural 
advantage on libel defendants, obviously reflects Justice White’s 
understanding of the logic of the summary judgment standard rather than 
great sympathy for the First Amendment defenses of accused libelers. 
Ironically, Justice Brennan dissented based on his views about 
preserving jury trial rights in civil cases; Justice Rehnquist also 
dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger.84 Nowhere in any of the 
decisions was there any suggestion that the Times v. Sullivan standard 
was anything other than firmly entrenched law. 
Indeed, once Justice White got his feelings about Times v. Sullivan off 
his chest in Dun & Bradstreet, they never reappeared in any subsequent 
opinion he wrote or joined, despite ample opportunities presented by 
later decisions involving libel. And with one minor exception, those 
criticisms were never taken up by any other Justices—the sole exception 
being a dissent from denial of certiorari written by Chief Justice Burger 
and joined by Justice Rehnquist near the end of the 1985 Term, which 
called for the reexamination of Times v. Sullivan.85 Notably, Justice 
White did not join that dissent, although it invoked his opinion in Dun & 
Bradstreet. 
Since 1986, the Court’s relatively few forays into the area of 
defamation law have involved the working out of details, with the 
assumption that Times v. Sullivan and Gertz provide the governing 
principles.86 Beyond the area of defamation, Times v. Sullivan’s tribute 
to our “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” has 
achieved iconic stature in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence 
and is regularly invoked by Justices across the ideological spectrum.87 
Not even Justice Scalia, who is reputed to have said that he regards 
Times v. Sullivan as wrongly decided,88 has ever expressed that thought 
in an opinion since his appointment to the Court. Indeed, he joined the 
Court in extending the Times v. Sullivan standard to claims of intentional 
                                                     
84. Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 268 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
85. Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broad. & Cable, Inc., 476 U.S. 1187 (1986) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
86. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991); Harte-Hanks 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989). 
87. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 467–68 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., 
announcing the opinion of the Court). 
88. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 34, at 3–4. 
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infliction of emotional distress in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,89 
and he has repeatedly joined opinions that are premised on the holding 
of Times v. Sullivan or that cite it favorably.90 Justice Scalia’s opinion 
for the Court in District of Columbia v. Heller91 even invoked Times v. 
Sullivan as precedent for the proposition that there is nothing illegitimate 
about the Court’s discovery of the scope of a constitutional amendment 
two centuries after its adoption: “Even a question as basic as the scope 
of proscribable libel,” he wrote, “was not addressed by this Court until 
1964, nearly two centuries after the founding.”92 
In short, Times v. Sullivan continues to tower over the fields of libel 
law and First Amendment jurisprudence generally, and its continued 
hegemony is not in serious doubt. Dun & Bradstreet, by contrast, is a 
footnote (albeit a fairly important one in its limited area of operation). 
My interpretation of the record compiled by Levine and Wermiel is that 
the case never truly called into question the continued vitality of Times 
v. Sullivan in anyone’s mind except Justice White’s (and, in response, 
Justice Brennan’s and his clerks’). The only real continuing importance 
of Justice White’s opinion is that it was so ineffectual as to confirm 
rather than undermine Times v. Sullivan’s vitality. 
Levine and Wermiel have provided a fascinating and useful case 
study of how the history of a Supreme Court decision can be traced in 
detail through the papers made available to the public by the former 
Justices of the Court. But Dun & Bradstreet also illustrates that 
sometimes the Justices’ footnote wars are less important than they may 
seem from the standpoint of the particular Justices and law clerks who 
are directly involved. The wealth of detail now available about the 
drafting of any one set of opinions should not lead students of the Court 
to miss the forest for the trees. 
 
                                                     
89. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
90. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Masson, 501 U.S. at 525 (White, J., 
joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
91. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
92. Id. at 626 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). 
